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Abstract This article asks three connected questions:
First, does the public view private and public utilities dif-
ferently, and if so, does this affect attitudes to conserva-
tion? Second, do public and private utilities differ in their
approaches to conservation? Finally, do differences in the
approaches of the utilities, if any, relate to differences in
public attitudes? We survey public attitudes in California
toward (hypothetical but plausible) voluntary and man-
dated water conservation, as well as to price increases,
during a recent period of shortage. We do this by inter-
viewing households in three pairs of adjacent public and
private utilities. We also survey managers of public and
private urban water utilities to see if they differ in their
approaches to conservation and to their customers. On the
user side we do not find pronounced differences, though a
minority of customers in all private companies would be
more willing to conserve or pay higher prices under a
public operator. No respondent in public utility said the
reverse. Negative attitudes toward private operators were
most pronounced in the pair marked by a controversial
recent privatization and a price hike. Nonetheless, we find
that California’s history of recurrent droughts and the
visible role of the state in water supply and drought man-
agement undermine the distinction between public and
private. Private utilities themselves work to underplay the
distinction by stressing the collective ownership of the
water source and the collective value of conservation.
Overall, California’s public utilities appear more proactive
and target-oriented in asking their customers to conserve
than their private counterparts and the state continues to be
important in legitimating and guiding conservation
behavior, whether the utility is in public hands or private.
Keywords Water conservation  Droughts 
Privatization  Public perceptions  California
Introduction
Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and
intensity of droughts in many parts of the world (Kallis
2008). Conservation in the face of supply constraints is a key
adaptation option for the urban water sector (Ivey and others
2005). This might include longer-term policies such as
consumer education, retrofitting and price reform, as well as
short-term responses, such as voluntary appeals for restraints
in water consumption, mandatory cutbacks of certain uses or
tariffs penalizing excessive consumption (Baumann and
others 1998; Butler and Memon 2006). There is a growing
literature on the effectiveness of different tools to manage
domestic water demand (Martı´nez-Espin˜eira 2002; Mazz-
anti and Montini 2006; Nauges and Thomas 2003; Wentz and
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Gober 2007; Butler and Memon 2006; Dalhuisen and others
2003; Domene and Saurı´ 2006).
In these works, the determinants of conservation behavior
are typically the management tools themselves, and the
socio-economic characteristics of the water users, such as
income or types of uses. Conservation behavior is implicitly
assumed to be independent of the institutional set-up, the
relationship between the user and the provider, or whether
the control of the system is public or private. Willingness to
pay is implicitly assumed to be independent of who is to be
paid. Yet anecdotal evidence from cities in the UK, where
formerly public water utilities have been fully privatized,
suggests that users might become less receptive to conser-
vation appeals or mandatory cutbacks (Haughton 1998;
Howarth 1999; Bakker 2000, 2005; Howarth and Butler
2004). Greater resistance to price changes has also been
noted elsewhere (Hall and Lobina 2004). That institutional
set-up might affect conservation behavior or willingness to
pay is not totally surprising; for example, ecological eco-
nomic studies critical of mainstream valuation studies have
long argued that willingness to pay for conservation depends
on institutional structure and the specifics of who is to be paid
(Jacobs 1994; Vatn 2005; Spash 2008). Anecdotal evidence
also suggests that privatization changes the utilities’
approach toward conservation, private utilities generally
being more reluctant to impose hardships on their users or to
mandate cut-backs (Howarth 1999).
User cooperation and compliance with water use
restrictions are widely-used and cost-effective tools for
dealing with temporary shortages or multi-year droughts. If
private utilities face resistance in employing such tools,
their response options to crises are reduced. This is all the
more true if the main alternative, higher water prices or
special tariffs, are also likely to be strongly resisted (see
Dinar 2000). The impacts of private sector participation in
water services have attracted considerable interest (e.g.
Osumanu 2008; Zhong and others 2008). The few peer-
reviewed, quantitative comparisons of private and public
water utilities that exist focus mainly on production effi-
ciency and water pricing (see Davis 2005). Studies that
have analyzed differences in customer attitudes and per-
ceptions focus mainly on satisfaction with services (e.g.
Ogden 1997; Hall and Lobina 2004). In this article we
explore whether water conservation behaviors may be
affected by whether the water service provider is public or
private and whether, in turn, this makes a difference to
utilities’ approach to conservation.
California is a good case for such research given the mix
of public and private arrangements in the State, literally one
next to the other. Several excellent studies discuss the effi-
cacy of demand-side management policies in times of
shortage in California (e.g. Berk and others 1993; Pint 1999;
Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000), but
these do not explore the distinctions between public and
private utilities. Through customer surveys we ask whether
there are any differences in the willingness to accept more
stringent conservation or higher water prices between adja-
cent publicly controlled and privately controlled utilities.
Conversely, through interviews and surveys of utility man-
agers, we ask if there are differences between the conser-
vation strategies of California’s public and private utilities
during periods of water shortage. Based on our findings, we
develop hypotheses to explain the differences, if any.
Our research finds that, in California, recent and con-
troversial privatizations do exhaust the willingness of users
to cooperate with the utility. Users are especially resistant
to mandatory restrictions and to price hikes. Users in older,
more established privatizations do not differ significantly
from users in public water systems, although there appears
to be a minority with strong opinions against private con-
trol of water. Almost all users expressed their willingness
to conserve voluntarily in a drought. In California the
wholesale supply remains in public hands (e.g. the State
Water Project) and the state remains active and visible in
drought planning and management. We hypothesize that
these features, together with the pro-conservation values
revealed by our surveys, reinforce the collective rather than
commodified nature of even ‘‘privatized’’ water. Our
results pertain to California and cannot be assumed to hold
elsewhere; however, our effort to understand willingness to
conserve or pay as a function of who is being paid suggests
that specific histories of drought and of privatization play a
significant role in consumer perceptions.
We find that the role of state agencies remains central to
the functioning of privatized utilities. Private utilities in
California tend to wait for the state to declare a drought
before they put pressure on their customers to conserve and
they prefer to run conservation programs with, or through,
their overseeing public water agencies. This way, in times of
water stress, it is more the state making demands on its cit-
izens than a corporate entity making demands on its cus-
tomers. Our surveys show that, in responding to droughts,
California’s public (i.e. municipal) systems are more flexible
and proactive than their regulated private counterparts.
Methods
To investigate consumer attitudes toward private and
public utilities, we conducted a random telephone survey of
600 water users in three pairs of urban water service areas
in California. Randomization was intended to eliminate
researcher bias and to get a representative sample; the
latter, of course, cannot be guaranteed. Our sampling frame
was the customer list of each of the six utilities. These were
San Jose versus San Francisco (serving over 750,000
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customers each), Thousand Oaks (in two parts, with over
40,000 customers each) and Felton versus Ben Lomond
(serving between 1000 and 2000 customers each) (Fig. 1
and Table 1). In each pair, one urban water system is owned
by a public utility and the other is owned by a private utility.
In each private case, the assets had been divested, perma-
nently or at least for the long-term, to an investor-owned
corporate entity. We selected adjacent areas to minimize the
effects of cultural, urban form and socio-economic differ-
ences, but within-pair differences remain (see Table 1).
Media coverage of water privatization also differs across
these communities. There has been significant regional and
state coverage of the privatization and the subsequent price
hike in Felton. In Thousand Oaks and San Jose there has
been little to no coverage given that both are established
privatizations. In San Francisco there is limited coverage of
water utilities, but more press on a highly visible contro-
versy over many years concerning proposals to municipal-
ize the private electricity company (PG&E).
The survey assessed (i) how willing users were in each
service area to respond to voluntary appeals for (a set of
hypothetical and increasingly demanding) cutbacks during
periods of water shortage; (ii) how users might respond if
their provider required them to cut back on water use; (iii)
how willing users were to pay higher water prices to cover
the cost of infrastructure improvements; (iv) if users
thought that their responses would be influenced by whe-
ther their providers were public or private; and (v) whether
users were aware of the public/private character of their
utility. The survey also gathered data on the degree to
which users were already practicing some forms of water
conservation, their average monthly water bills, and their
annual household incomes.
In designing the survey, we kept in mind the well-
known shortcomings of randomly sampled telephone
numbers as a proxy for the broader population of interest.
These shortcomings include not speaking with an appro-
priate respondent, possible sample bias because of who is
likely to be home to take the call, respondent dropout
before the survey is completed, possible biases because
many refuse to participate in any phone survey, and pos-
sible selection bias because of respondent interest in the
topic of the survey (see Bryman 2008). We took several
measures to avoid such biases in our sample. These mea-
sures included speaking only with adults, noting if the
household was responsible for paying its own water bills
(as many renters in California do not pay their own water
bills), making calls at different times and days during the
week, keeping the survey as short as possible and revealing
our specific survey topic only after the respondent con-
sented to being interviewed. We introduced the question
about the private or public character of the water utility
only as the survey was coming to a close.
We recognize that how users respond to questions
regarding hypothetical situations is not necessarily predic-
tive of actual actions once users are placed in those situa-
tions. The social psychology literature on environmental
values and habits has repeatedly shown poor correlation
between stated pro-conservation values and actual user
behavior (e.g. Hamilton 1985; Aitken and others 1994; de
Oliver 1999). Other research argues that some specific atti-
tudes, e.g. the perceived value that a garden adds to the home,
are better predictors than others of consumers’ water use
(Syme and others 1991). This literature is mixed on the
ability of conservation messages or education to reduce
water use; it has been shown to have some (albeit limited)
effect (Thompson and Stoutemyer 1991; Howarth and Butler
2004), especially when consumers were made aware of the
dissonance between their stated values and their actual habits
(Dickerson and others 1992; Aitken and others 1994). As
with the demand-side management literature cited above,
few of these explicitly consider the effect of privatization on
consumer attitudes or behavior. In this article, we present
user responses not as predictions of future water use, but as
current perceptions that may reveal which policy changes are
likely to be more or less acceptable.
To investigate how water utilities view their users, and
what they expect they can or cannot ask of them in periods of
drought, we conducted a telephone survey of conservation
managers in 31 (randomly selected) private and 34 public
utilities through the summer and fall of 2007. Although
decisions in utilities are made by broader teams of managers,
Fig. 1 California and the six case studies
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conservation managers are those on the frontline. 2007 was a
dry year statewide. By July, 17 California counties were
declared to be drought disasters, and the rest of the state was
in ‘‘moderate to severe’’ condition. Because droughts occur
slowly, over a multi-year period, water managers are under
pressure at the first signs of drought, lest the following year
also be a dry one. And indeed, 2008 in California was also
dry. By May 31, 2007, reservoirs in Northern California were
at 91%–97% of their historical capacity for the time of year;
by May 31 2008 these figures had fallen to 58–94%
(http://watersupplyconditions.water.ca.gov).
The telephone survey of conservation managers asked
whether their utilities issued calls for water conservation in
the summer of 2007, if any mandatory cuts on water use
were issued, and what types of messages and tools were
used to inform the users about drought conditions and the
actions they should undertake to conserve. The survey also
collected information on the source of the water for each
utility. Utilities that relied, for example, on local surface
sources in drought-affected areas had the greatest incentive
to act early to counter the drought. Utilities relying on
groundwater are more buffered. The State Water Project,
from which many utilities import water, was not officially
in a state of drought, but some utilities were already
reacting to the lower than average runoff from the Sierra
Nevada watersheds, and to court orders to restrict the
Project’s withdrawals from the California Delta to protect
the endangered Delta Smelt. In addition to these surveys,
for all 65 utilities, we analyzed the content of information
sheets containing conservation calls that were sent to their
customers and (often) posted on their websites.
Finally, we conducted in-depth interviews with key
informants: water conservation managers in one public and
one neighboring private utility. Both are in the same
catchment and dependent on local sources, and both faced
drought conditions over the summer of 2007. We discussed
whether and how they tried to make users consume less
water, the messages they used to induce conservation, and
more generally their views of how their customers per-
ceived them. Our primary goal for these interviews was to
understand better the reasoning behind the messages and
approaches chosen for their respective conservation calls,
and the extent of conservation hoped for or expected from
their respective customers.
Results of Users’ Survey
This section presents the main results of the users’ survey.
We provide evidence concerning users’ awareness of the
public or private character of their utilities, and their will-
ingness to conserve water, accept mandatory conservation
and pay higher rates. We report data aggregated over the
three public versus the three private utilities, and also the
results for each public–private pair. For all questions with
yes-no-n/a responses, we conducted t-tests to determine if
the reported difference in proportions within each utility was
significant. For questions that had a range of responses, such
as a three-part positive-negative-neutral, or a five-part will-
ing to unwilling, we conducted chi-squared tests to see if the
overall responses were significantly different in the private
versus public parts of each paired set. Throughout the text,
we report those results for which the proportions t-test or chi-
squared test was significant at the 0.95 level.
Awareness of Public or Private Character of Provider
Aggregate data for the public versus the private utilities
show that users overall have comparable levels of aware-
ness of who their provider is and whether it is public or
private. In the public utilities, 63% of the respondents both
knew who their water provider was and knew that it was
public. In the private utilities 73% knew the provider and
62% identified it as private. Disaggregated data, however,
reveals Felton as the case with near-universal awareness (at
91%) of the provider and private ownership. Felton and
Ben Lomond are the only utilities in which the awareness
levels were statistically significant.
Privatization in Felton is recent and controversial (Squires
2008); many of our interviewees talked spontaneously about
privatization and had strong opinions about it. (We note that
in June 2008, after we had completed our data collection, the
water system in Felton was bought back by a local entity; see
www.remunicipalisation.org). Responses such as ‘‘they’re a
sham’’ (interviewee #531) came up at the mere mention of
‘‘water provider.’’ A spillover effect of Felton’s privatization
controversy to neighboring Ben Lomond may explain its
high levels of awareness about the municipal character of the
provider. Twenty interviewees from Ben Lomond brought
up privatization in Felton, again without prompting. Most
used phrases such as ‘‘it’s a disaster in Felton’’ (#491); ‘‘our
neighbors are getting gouged by a private company’’ (#423);
or ‘‘I hope our water doesn’t get bought by a foreign com-
pany’’ (#449). In comparison, in the older, well-established
privatizations of Thousand Oaks and San Jose, there were
few spontaneous references to the private character of the
provider. In fact in San Jose and Thousand Oaks-CalAm
more users knew who their provider was than knew that it
was private.
Responsiveness to Conservation Appeals
The stated willingness of users to respond to appeals to
conserve water voluntarily is generally high, except for the
rather drastic step of ‘‘stop watering the garden’’. As
expected, more users are willing to make modest rather
Environmental Management (2010) 45:177–191 181
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than severe cutbacks (Fig. 2). There are no statistically
significant differences between users in public and private
utilities overall. The pairwise comparisons show a similar
pattern of across-the-board responsiveness. The similarity
between statements in public and private utilities indicates
a baseline profile of conservation willingness in these
municipalities.
The comments that many interviewees spontaneously
added to our discussions were consistent with the pro-
conservation sentiments expressed in their survey respon-
ses. Users expressed relatively idealistic attitudes toward
voluntary conservation (see also Hamilton 1983; 1985).
One in ten interviewees brought up the hydrological fea-
tures of California or their memories of drought in the early
1990 s. They explicitly referred to their responsibility as
good Californians to conserve water when needed. In
Thousand Oaks many users were familiar with conserva-
tion calls, saying ‘‘we’ve done this before, we’ll do it
again’’ (#333) or ‘‘we know what to do in times of short-
age’’ (#343). In Felton, several respondents who later in the
interview made critical and unprovoked references to pri-
vatization were eager to say that drought is a collective
problem for all Californians. One response from Felton,
echoed by many, was, ‘‘in the case of drought the whole
State will have to conserve’’ (#508). Another respondent
referred to himself as part of California’s ‘‘conservation
generation’’ (#510). We return to this collective sense of
responsibility later in the article.
Willingness to Accept Mandatory Conservation
Responses changed considerably when the question con-
cerning conservation took a mandatory tone. Users had a
less positive view of mandatory restrictions on car washing
and garden watering (50% positive in the public utilities
and 36% in the private) than to voluntary appeals for the
same cutbacks. Disaggregating the data into pairwise
comparisons shows that Felton and Ben Lomond account
for a large part of the aggregate public–private difference.
The differences in attitudes to mandatory restrictions, with
users in the private utilities being overall less accepting of
these, are statistically significant for both Ben Lomond vs.
Felton and San Jose vs. San Francisco. Differences in
Thousand Oaks are within the limits of statistical error.
Users who responded positively to even mandatory
cutbacks often referred to the collective character of
droughts, their civic responsibilities, and their duty ‘‘to
help the environment’’ (#24). One Ben Lomond respondent
put it succinctly: ‘‘I would comply. I’m a citizen’’ (# 429).
However, several respondents in public and private utilities
alike said that they did not like mandatory orders and the
water agencies ‘‘controlling [their] lifestyle’’ (# 229).
No respondent made a spontaneous comment on the
public or private character of the provider for this question,
except in Felton. Answers there were characteristically
negative, with many saying they would be ‘‘annoyed’’
(#506) or ‘‘angry’’ (#540) if restrictions were applied.
Twelve respondents referred explicitly to the private
character of the company with phrases such as ‘‘they are
gouging us’’ (#511) or ‘‘I don’t trust them’’ (#581). Other
Felton respondents saw conservation as part of their civic
duty, sometimes switching in the course of the short
interview between seeing themselves as citizens of the state
and as customers of the company. So while some said ‘‘as a
Californian I have to conserve water if my State faces a
crisis’’ (#545), others, or even the same respondents, might
say something like ‘‘no, they [the company] are taking
advantage of the situation’’ (#526).
Willingness to Pay Higher Water Prices
Other than appeals for voluntary conservation or manda-
tory restrictions, pricing instruments are the main response
to water shortages. Willingness to pay higher rates appears
Fig. 2 Stated willingness to
conserve water voluntarily.
Aggregate results
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relatively low compared to that for other responses. There
were no discernible effects of household income within
each utility for this response. In some instances we saw the
expected positive correlation between household income
and the stated willingness to pay more; in other instances
there was no clear pattern. But more users in public utilities
say they are willing or somewhat willing to pay higher
rates (25% versus 13%), and more users in private than in
public utilities say they are reluctant or unwilling to do so
(56% versus 33%). Disaggregating the data shows that
much of this aggregate difference is due to Felton versus
Ben Lomond. In all paired comparisons the unwillingness/
reluctance to pay more is higher in the private counterpart
(Fig. 3), but the only statistically significant difference is
between Felton and Ben Lomond. We note, however, that
the median monthly water bill reported in Felton was $65,
as compared to $35 in Ben Lomond, a difference resulting
from the substantial increase of prices post privatization
(Table 1). In this regard Felton is similar to other recent
privatizations that have often been accompanied by higher
water prices.
Public Versus Private: Do the Users Care?
For the great majority of users the willingness to conserve
water does not depend on whether their provider is public
or private. 80% of the respondents in public utilities and
75% in private utilities said that their responses would be
unchanged based on the public or private nature of their
providers. Nevertheless, a considerable minority in private
Felton (26%) said they would be more willing to conserve
if their utility were public, and smaller minorities in public
Ben Lomond and San Francisco said they would be less
willing to conserve under a private provider (Fig. 4).
When it comes to paying more for water, the issue of
utility ownership seems more salient. 58% of public and
56% of private users overall were neutral with respect to
the ownership of the utility. But 56% of respondents in Ben
Lomond would be less inclined to pay higher rates to a
private provider; the relationship in Felton is the mirror
opposite, with 64% being more willing to pay a public
provider (Fig. 5). In both cities respondents repeatedly
referred to ‘‘profiteering’’(#412, #429, #486, #533, #545,
Fig. 3 Stated willingness to
pay higher rates. Results for
each utility. Note: The 30%
figure is arbitrary; we chose it
because it is typical of the price
increases that many private
operators in California ask for in
their regulatory reviews.
Tenants who do not pay their
own water bills were classified
in the n/a category and not
included in the chi-squared tests
Fig. 4 Stated effect of
(de)privatization on
conservation responses. Results
for each utility
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#572). Pairwise differences between Felton and Ben Lo-
mond and between San Francisco and San Jose are sig-
nificant at the 0.95 level.
Overall, for most users outside of Felton and Ben Lo-
mond, the private control of water provision does not affect
willingness to conserve water voluntarily or to pay higher
rates. However, a minority of users in each paired set
voiced a greater willingness to cooperate with public rather
than private entities. Not a single respondent from any
public utility said that they would be more willing to
conserve or pay more if their provider were private.
We invited respondents to explain their answers with
respect to their attitudes toward utilities being public or
private. Concerning voluntary conservation, many to whom
privatization did not matter emphasized that water con-
servation is not about private or public: ‘‘Water is water’’
(#109, #274, #380). Others referred to the ‘‘universal value
of conservation’’ (#487). In Felton, some users explicitly
separated conservation from the complaints they had about
the company; as one put it, ‘‘we need to conserve in Cal-
ifornia’’ (#527). In response to our pricing questions,
however, negative references to the character of the utility
were made in all three private cases. Users linked their
unwillingness to pay to utility profits, managers’ high sal-
aries and monopolistic supply conditions. In San Jose
responses included ‘‘they have tons of money’’ (#193) or
‘‘they are charging [for] perks for the Board, they could
allocate resources better’’ (#194). In Felton almost all
comments were explicitly linked to the water company:
‘‘they make enough money’’ (#542); ‘‘they don’t deserve
anything more’’ (#591); and ‘‘I hate them’’ (#507). In
addition some users expressed lack of trust in a private
provider (‘‘I wouldn’t believe them’’ (#258, #408); or ‘‘I
wouldn’t trust them’’ (#417, #535). Similarly negative
comments came up in Felton and Ben Lomond also in
response to the question about mandatory conservation.
We now disaggregate the results of willingness to pay
more or to conserve more by those who knew and those
who did not know the public or private nature of their
provider. In our interviews, about two thirds of respondents
in public and private utilities knew the nature of their pro-
vider. The overall patterns and differences described above
remain after this disaggregation. For example, there is no
difference in attitudes toward voluntary cutbacks between
those who knew and those who didn’t know in public and
private utilities. But within private utilities we see that those
who knew that their provider was private appeared even less
willing to accept mandatory restrictions or to pay higher
rates than those who did not know it (Fig. 6). When broken
down by utility, the differences are pronounced within
Felton and Thousand Oaks private, but less so in San Jose.
The public utilities showed no similar differences.
Summary of User Surveys
Where privatization has been recent and controversial, as
in Felton, users in the community as well as adjacent ones
are very aware of who their provider is and its private or
public character. Where privatization is old and well
established, as in San Jose or Thousand Oaks, users are less
likely to know that their provider is private. Users in all
utilities show high and comparable levels of willingness to
respond to voluntary appeals to conserve. Mandatory cut-
backs are less acceptable than voluntary appeals. Users in
private utilities appear more resistant to mandatory cut-
backs, especially when they know that the utility is private.
Users across the board are negative toward price hikes,
even more than toward water use restrictions. There is a
baseline pro-conservation sentiment among Californians,
partially linked to the collective attributes of the water
system. These include state ownership and operation of
wholesale water supplies, statewide vulnerability to the
same weather conditions, collective experience of recent
droughts, and the widely appreciated environmental bene-
fits of conservation. Most users believe that their willing-
ness to pay and especially their conservation behaviors do
Fig. 5 Stated effect of
(de)privatization on pricing
responses. Results for each
utility
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not depend on whether their provider is public or private. A
majority of users in Felton, however, as well as in adjacent
Ben Lomond, say they would be more willing to pay higher
rates or to conserve if the provider were public. There are
indications of latent anti-privatization views in other util-
ities too, as sizeable minorities (10–20%) would be more
willing to conserve or pay more if the provider were public.
Private profits, lack of trust, and high prices were some of
the reasons given by respondents who were more willing to
conserve or pay under a public provider. No user served by
a public utility expressed greater willingness to conserve or
pay more with a private utility.
Results of Utilities’ Survey
We now discuss the results of our surveys and interviews
with managers in private and public utilities, and our con-
tent analysis of their conservation calls to their customers.
Providers’ Responses to Drought of 2007
Our comparative analysis of 34 public and 31 private
providers during March–November 2007 shows that, while
most did not initiate conservation measures, public pro-
viders were somewhat more likely to act proactively and
appeal to their users to use less water because of the
drought. Out of the 65 utilities in our sample, 16 said they
had called for additional conservation that summer, and 13
of those were public. The difference remains even after
taking into account the use of groundwater, a source that
could partially buffer the utility from drought. Among
agencies where surface water is the main source (ground-
water \50% of supply), more public than private utilities
called for voluntary rationing. Two public utilities that
relied mostly on groundwater issued a conservation call.
Private providers in California tend to be smaller than
public providers, but size should not affect the ability to
implement the soft conservation measures typically used in
early stages of drought. Proactive measures in these early
stages consisted primarily of appeals to cut back on specific
water uses such as landscape watering, stepped up outreach
and monitoring, and incentives to use water-conserving
appliances such as low-flow showerheads.
Private utilities in California are under the jurisdiction
of, and in some cases are supplied with water from, larger,
public districts. These have the responsibility for moni-
toring drought conditions, for declaring severity stages, and
Fig. 6 Aggregate results for
mandatory conservation and
higher rates from users who
knew and didn’t know if the
utility was public or private
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activating predefined responses. Private utilities cannot
mandate water restrictions on their own authority, but they
can ask the regulator to allow them to do so, and they do
not need permission to ask for voluntary rationing. Private
utilities are free to take the initiative and appeal for vol-
untary rationing, simply by notifying the regulator, the
Public Utility Commission (PUC). For mandatory ration-
ing, prior approval from the PUC is required. The costs of
the rationing program can be recovered if future price
reviews approve the cost.
In California, therefore, water conservation is not the
business only of providers at the municipal level, but also
of state water agencies, wholesale providers and regional
water districts. Regional initiatives in the summer of 2007
included the ‘‘Water Saving Hero’’ campaign by Bay Area
water organizations, the 10% conservation campaign of the
Santa Clara Valley Water District and the 20-gallon per
person challenge of the San Diego Water Authority. Eight
providers (6 public and 2 private) ran their water conser-
vation campaigns through one of these initiatives. The
public providers that adopted these initiatives ran them as
(or with) their own campaigns by providing information on
their websites, local newspapers, etc. In contrast, the two
private providers directed us for further information to their
(public) wholesalers/districts. Another private company
manager in our sample reported that they did not have a
conservation campaign because they ‘‘didn’t want to
duplicate’’ the wholesaler’s campaign (# Utility Interview
(UI) 40).
As an example of how the utilities in our sample
motivated their conservation calls, we contrast the
approaches of public Santa Cruz and private California
America (CalAm)-Monterey. The two cities are located at
opposite ends of the Monterey Bay and face the same
hydro-climatic conditions. The responses of these utilities
to the drought conditions of 2007 reflect the differences we
found in the larger survey. Santa Cruz acted earlier and
more aggressively. Specific conservation targets were set,
voluntary rationing was requested, outdoor irrigation was
restricted, and standing ordinances that prohibit water
wastage were reinforced through additional reminders and
publicity (Fig. 7). Monterey-CalAm acted later, did not call
for voluntary rationing of specific uses and did not prohibit
specific actions. Instead of a targeted constraint message, it
called for a general caution on water consumption,
appealing to the environmental value of a healthy and
Fig. 7 Santa Cruz’s
conservation call; May 2007
(Rescinded April 2008). Note:
Managers at Santa Cruz Water
monitor the condition of their
resource system and can go
regularly to the City Council for
approval either to implement or
to remove rationing. Though
2008 was also a dry year, the
utility decided to rescind the
landscape irrigation prohibition
in April because, ‘‘the bottom
line is, we did not see the same
level of drawdown of our
reservoir as we projected for
2007’’ (Toby Goddard, Water
Conservation Manager, Santa
Cruz Water District, personal
communication)
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replenished Carmel river (Fig. 8). The Monterey Regional
District had declared a Level 1 drought severity by Fall
2007, but CalAm kept a low profile, and, rather than
publicize the attendant restrictions on its website, directed
its users to the District’s page.
Our initial research question was whether private and
public utilities differ in their conservation approaches and,
if so, whether this is partly a response to different expec-
tations of their customers. In this respect, the words of a
private company manager, responsible for two of the cities
in our sample, seem relevant. Justifying why her company
did not take action during the summer’s drought, she told
us: ‘‘we are a private company so it is very difficult to tell
customers to do things’’ (#UI42). Another private manager
cited public indifference to such appeals: ‘‘in the past we
asked customers to voluntarily conserve, and they didn’t
conserve at all’’ (#UI56). A different explanation given by
a respondent from a company responsible for three cities
was that it is not within his company’s authority to decide
when to restrict water usage; this is the task of the public
authorities that oversee it (#UI56). Our utilities survey
suggests that there are some public–private differences in
California and that these are in part driven by the utilities’
perceptions of their customers, but with our small number
of responses this must be more a hypothesis than a
conclusion.
Differences in the financial incentives of public and
private utilities might also play a role. In principle profit
(rather than price) regulation of private companies by PUC
intends to remove disincentives for water saving. Private
utilities can recover conservation expenditures if the PUC
has approved a related program and/or a statewide drought
emergency has been officially declared. Such ‘‘revenue
adjustment mechanisms’’ to recoup losses are created on a
case by case basis, and not all private water utilities have
made yet the shift. Profit regulation on the basis of returns
to capital is also more likely to reward systems expansion
and less likely to reward those conservation measures that
cannot readily be capitalized.
To further explore what might underlie our survey
findings, we decided to conduct extended interviews with
the water managers of two utilities who agreed to speak
with us. One is public and the other private; they are
located close to one another and were subject to the same
drought conditions in 2007. We asked our interviewees to
reflect both on their own utilities’ conservation strategies
and on the differences we found between public and private
utilities in our sample. We now turn to the insights from
these interviews, not treating them as ‘‘representative’’ of
public versus private utilities, but as illustrative of insider
accounts of utility management in California.
Utility A and Utility B
We refer to the two utilities whose managers we inter-
viewed as Utility A and Utility B to protect the
Fig. 8 CalAm Monterey’s
conservation call, 2007
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confidentiality of our interviewees. Both utilities rely on
local water sources, A on surface water and B on
groundwater. Utility A is a public entity and Utility B is a
subsidiary of a private company. Utility B is under the
jurisdiction of a Water Management District (‘the Dis-
trict’), responsible for the regional drought plan. Prices,
profits and mandatory rationing for Utility B are regulated
by the PUC.
In our interviews, the city-run utility representatives
were quick to emphasize the differences between a city
water department and a private corporation. A city
department (they argued) has to strike trade-offs between
water services and other public goals. Private corporations
have to show profits, which reduces the scope for revenue-
reducing conservation measures. A city department can
plan for restrictions whereas a private corporation tends to
plan for nearly 100% supply reliability. Utility A’s man-
agers argued, with no prompting from us, that this reflects
both the different mindset of private corporations, and
different expectations of users, who are less tolerant of
restrictions from private companies. The accountability of
municipal utilities to the public through town-hall meetings
and other fora gives them the legitimacy to ask for sacri-
fices or mandate cutbacks if needed. Their private coun-
terparts instead are expected to deliver service whatever the
cost. This was perhaps the reason why some private utili-
ties were keen to link conservation measures to environ-
mental factors and their obligations to environmental
regulators. In our interviewees’ opinion, private utilities
want to make clear that reducing consumption is good for
the environment (thus appealing to their users as citizens of
California as opposed as customers of their product), and
that external regulations (i.e. the state) are responsible for
any forced conservation.
Interviewees at Utility B agreed that many of their
corporate colleagues in the rest of the U.S. see a conflict
between conservation and a mandate to ‘‘sell water’’. They
argued, however, that this is less the case for private util-
ities in California, because profit regulation by the PUC
partially delinks consumption from revenue. Utility B’s
conservation call in 2007 was softer than Utility A’s early,
targeted and well-publicized efforts to conserve. Why did
Utility B not emulate the actions of Utility A, and ask for
voluntary rationing, in the same hydro-climatic conditions,
especially if, according to interviewees, PUC regulation
reduced profit disincentives? According to our private
utility interviewees, the main driver of water management
was the environmental regulator’s constraints on maximum
allowed withdrawals, not hydro-climatic conditions as
such. In terms of allowed withdrawals, Utility B was doing
well. Furthermore, Utility B could not recover expenditures
from any rationing campaign unless a statewide drought
had been declared and the PUC allowed it to recover costs.
Utility A was not thus constrained. In effect, there was an
economic incentive to wait for harsher conditions.
Utility B managers did not agree with our Utility A
interviewees that private companies were unlikely to
implement mandatory rationing. They argued that if the
‘‘going gets tough’’, the District would declare higher
drought severity stages and then they would have to
implement the rationing measures foreseen in the regional
drought plan. Our interviewees did confirm that conserva-
tion outreach linked to the environment provides good
publicity for a private water company in California. Fur-
thermore, California-wide feelings of the need to protect
the common good make it acceptable to impose rationing
during severe droughts. But the utility recognized that
interventionist approaches such as rationing could be
problematic for customer relations. This is precisely why
they do not wish to ‘‘burden’’ users before a drought has
been formally declared. It is the State or the District that
declares drought emergencies and the PUC that approves
rationing. As far as Utility B is concerned, it simply
implements the orders of accountable, civic entities.
Our interviews suggest that one reason that fewer pri-
vate than public providers asked for voluntary rationing in
the early stages of the 2007 drought is that they were
waiting for the drought to become more severe. Regulators
could then approve and activate rationing (and allow
recovery of related expenditures), and public opinion
would become more tolerant of company-imposed restric-
tions. With respect to drought-related conservation, there-
fore, private utilities appear locked into working at the pace
of the regulatory process. Public utilities are more flexible
to act proactively and adapt to changing local conditions.
The City of Santa Cruz for example, was the first utility in
the State to implement voluntary rationing (April 2007; see
Fig. 7) but also the first to repeal them. Between Utilities A
and B, private B appeared more prepared to impose man-
datory rationing—since the responsibility would be borne
by the regulator. Of Utility A and B, it was Public A that
had assessed in advance the impacts of curtailment on its
customers, so rationing programs could be adapted to its
users’ needs and perceptions. For Utility B, in the words of
an interviewee, ‘‘the main customer of the company is the
regulator’’.
Summary of Utility Surveys/Interviews
Based on our surveys of 65 water utilities, and on extended
interviews at a public and a private utility, we suggest that
public utilities in California are more likely to act proac-
tively and ask for voluntary rationing at the early stages of
a drought. Private utilities are keener to wait for regulatory
orders before calling for restrictions. They are also more
likely to delegate conservation activities to, or share them
188 Environmental Management (2010) 45:177–191
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with, public agencies. This is partly because they feel the
conflict between selling water and requiring reductions in
consumption, partly because of the regulatory framework
and partly because their consumers may not tolerate com-
pany-imposed rationing. Where possible, the greater com-
mon good (such as healthy rivers or healthy fish) is alluded
to as a justification for even soft conservation calls.
Public utilities also launch strategic appeals to the
environmental values of their customers. They, too, are
concerned about their customers’ tolerance for cutbacks;
several of our interviewees pointed out that they face irate
customers regularly in open, public meetings. But they
appear less reluctant to ask for specific cutbacks or to
police water wastage, even in the absence of regulatory
oversight. In this way, they seem more confident of their
legitimacy, and are more flexible to act since they do not
rely on higher order authorization.
Public Versus Private: Does It Matter
for Conservation?
Our starting research question was whether individual
conservation behavior is influenced by the public or private
control of water provision, and reciprocally, whether there
are related differences in the way public and private pro-
viders approach conservation and their users. Of our three
paired comparisons, the Felton versus Ben Lomond survey
provides quantitative corroboration of what has been hinted
at in qualitative terms from studies elsewhere (Howarth
1999; Bakker 2000). The Felton case, suggests that priv-
atizations and their associated reforms can reduce conser-
vation potential by exhausting the willingness of users to
cooperate. Tariff reforms by a private company attract
attention to its profit making goals. If a controversial pri-
vatization effort is quickly followed by drought conditions,
the newly privatized utility could find itself unable to tap
user cooperation and unable to raise prices without further
public resistance. Price hikes are not specific to private
utilities, but privatizations are typically predicated on full-
cost recovery. Higher water prices and attendant contro-
versy have accompanied many recent privatizations (Hall
and others 2005; Davis 2005), and in this sense, the Felton
case is representative of many recent privatizations.
Our study is not conclusive, however, on how we should
interpret the results from Felton. Do cases like Felton
reveal a fundamental tension between corporate control
and civic values because people do not care to make sac-
rifices for a private company’s profits? Or are they the
result of a case-specific constellation of forces (price
increases, vocal opposition groups to privatization, media
coverage, and subsequent drought)? These questions
remain critical for understanding the public’s reactions to
private sector participation, not only for water that is often
considered ‘‘different’’ (see Hanemann 2006), but for other
services in which civic values are important for environ-
mental protection.
Whether there is an intrinsic link between privatization
and conservation behavior is not clear from our study. Our
remaining two cases on the users’ side show little a priori
influence of private ownership on willingness to conserve
or pay higher rates. Although our sample had a small
minority with strong anti-privatization opinions, and more
users seemed more willing to cooperate with a public
entity, overall the majority of users surveyed did not care.
Users across all utilities, including Felton and Ben Lo-
mond, were united in their willingness to conserve volun-
tarily during water shortages. Most of them referred to their
responsibilities as citizens and to the effects of drought on
all Californians. There is a collective and vivid memory of
recurrent drought in the region. Furthermore, even when
part of the water cycle in California is privatized, a sig-
nificant part remains under public control. The water
sources are public and the major wholesale suppliers (e.g.
the State Water Project) are public. The state-wide insti-
tutional framework and the widely understood environ-
mental benefits of conservation can easily overshadow
negative attitudes (if any) toward a private provider. That
the forging of a collective identity regardless of utility
ownership could be important in consumers’ willingness to
conserve during droughts has been suggested in some UK-
based research (see Strang 2001; cited in Howarth and
Butler 2004). Future research could extend to a different
set of case studies with differences in ownership such as in
England (private ownership) versus Wales (mutual own-
ership), though there again the presence of a strong eco-
nomic regulator could temper any potential differences.
From our utilities survey it seems that California’s
public utilities are more likely than private companies to
ask for voluntary conservation, but we cannot conclusively
say why. Profit incentives may play a role, though reforms
in economic regulation are diminishing some differences.
Our interviews suggest that private companies are cautious
about latent anti-water privatization views and that the
legitimacy of private firms in the eyes of the consumer may
influence the types of conservation-encouraging behaviors
in which they engage. Waiting until a drought has been
formally declared, prioritizing environmental values in
conservation messages, sharing conservation programs
with public entities and underplaying differences with
public operators by stressing regulation and public own-
ership of water, all serve to strengthen the collective
character of water, diminish the distinctiveness of private
control and blur the line between state and corporation. For
example, California American Water, one of the companies
in our utilities sample, states on its website that,
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independent of who locally manages water, the ‘‘people of
California own and control water’’. Underplaying its dif-
ferences with public providers, CalAm states that ‘‘all
operating procedures are identical … the differences
(being) in the financial model, … (where) publicly owned
water systems use… bond measures, grants, or allocations
from other funds (whereas) investor-owned water systems
use money from shareholders, for which they pay a return’’
(www.montereywaterfacts.com; 12/3/2008). Profit here is
reframed as just another financial model. Indeed, a con-
siderable number of interviewees in our sample, and not just
those in Felton and Ben Lomond, took issue precisely with
private profits out of water conservation or higher prices,
and linked it to their negative predisposition to cooperate.
This adaptation on the part of private utilities has a
paradoxical outcome. Privatization has been promoted on
the grounds that it reduces the role of an ineffective state
(Lee 1999; Savedoff and Spiller 1999) or because private
utilities are expected to be more flexible in dealing with
change and more focused on customer needs than their
public counterparts (Marvin and Guy 1997). What we find
in our case is almost the opposite. First, the role of the state
remains legally and discursively important after privatiza-
tion. And second, the public utilities appear more flexible
and proactive than their private counterparts in dealing
with shortages and water conservation. The private utilities
are locked into the pace of the regulatory process necessary
to legitimize their actions.
Finally, our surveys and interviews show that the pub-
lic–private binary, while common in the literature, and a
plausible entry point for this hypothesis-generating
research, should be revisited. The institutional set-up of
water provision, as the case of California shows, cannot be
easily classified as a public–private binary, as many func-
tions may remain in public hands even when a significant
part of the chain passes into private control. It might be
necessary to unpack the differences in operation and per-
ceptions that lie behind ‘‘private’’ or ‘‘public’’, such as
revenue and its distribution, trust, distance from the users,
public access to decisions, accountability to customers and
the locus of control (Wolff and Hallstein 2005). In turn,
this unpacking can help to envisage alternative institutional
arrangements for the delivery of water services and the
protection of water resources.
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